Notes on Diagrams and Maps

by

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Abstract

The paper “Notes on Diagrams and maps” of Alexander Gerner is an exploratory journey that hinges on the very question of what a map is. Gerner draws on the work of Stjernfelt, Krämer and, foremostly, Deleuze and Peirce. It is his contention that these authors’ work open up seminal ways of interpreting diagrammatic fixtures common to different notions of the map - as a diagrammatic knowledge tool or an ontological category preceding any representational semiotic operations. The diagrammatic operational and the ontological map reading, though evidently at cross-purposes, should not ultimately be seen as mutually exclusive.

This journey into the map territory in the second part of this paper reflects on contemporary map artists (Beltrán, Artur Bairrio, Thomas Hirschhorn & Marcus Steinweg etc.) and their artefacts. Art seems to surge as the place where a map can be accepted as the “map of itself”( Terry Atkinson & John Baldwin 1967). However, that is not to say that this of-itselfness is absent in scientific maps. It is simply not visible, focused on or accepted as such.

The “all knowing map” that Perkins (2008) describes as “scientific”, is a seen here as non-sensical. With Deleuze even the “chasm” between different cultures of map use (Perkins 2008) and separated “knowledge regimes” in science and art becomes questionable.

Introduction

This paper is a first exploratory journey that hinges on the very question of what a map is. To guide us, I will draw on the work of Stjernfelt, Krämer and, foremostly, Deleuze and Peirce. It is my preliminary contention that these authors’ work open up seminal ways of interpreting diagrammatic fixtures common to different notions of the map - as a diagrammatic knowledge tool or an ontological category preceding any representational semiotic operations.

Several concepts of the map category (Peirce; Stjernfelt 2007/ Perkins 2008/ Deleuze 1995) are proposed for debate. I will be taking a
closer look into the notion of a supposed split between diagrammatic spatial-visual maps and operational maps. I take up a suggestion from Deleuze, for whom maps should not be merely seen as visual fixed representations on a plane, as a plant or a scheme to derive knowledge from, but as primary and constitutive, revealing something of their own, “before” or “besides” their “proper” sign activity or function.

Concurrently, I will be analysing definitions of maps that picture them as fundamentally linked to their diagrammatic dimension.

Thus, I will try to sharpen our vision of two rival notions of what a map is. Under the first, which one may call Deleuzian, the map is apprehended as a cartographic entity whose ontological status precedes any given material diagram function. Under the second, the map is grasped as being essentially a diagrammatic tool, bridging the conceptual vs. intuitive gap in knowledge generation. This journey into the map territory in the second part of this paper reflects on map artists and their artefacts.

Deleuze (1995) locates the map inside a non-representational “plane of immanence”, preceding scientific inquiry, but nonetheless a necessary part of a orientational strategy, leading to logical activity in which insignificant or free “playthings” are transformed into “edge tools” for inquiry.

For Peirce, on the contrary, the map is a semiotic subtype of the diagram. As Stjernfelt (2007) and Günzel (2009) also concur, maps share with diagram a common identity, while being able to contain pictorial elements as well.

The tension between these two notions of the map, I claim, should be our starting-point when approaching the phenomenon of the map. Hence, the map is discussed across the diagramatic/ontologic divide, i.e., both

a) as a device, containing several superimposed diagram schemes and pictorial parts for orientation (Peirce)
b) as a cartographic apriori with an ontological claim of its own, preceding concrete diagram schemata (Deleuze).

The diagramatic and the ontological map reading, I would like to suggest, though evidently at cross-purposes, should not ultimately be seen as mutually exclusive.

This move is crucial and should be borne in mind when considering one of chosen focal points in this paper: the appropriation of maps for artistic purposes, and the hermeneutical regime its “framing “ in artistic settings is said to supersede.
The dislocation of maps into an artistic context is usually said to “kill”, “switch off” or “deconstruct” supposed conventionalized and pre-existing representational functions of a map, its “conventionalized” status of representation of a “real” object. By framing a map artefact in a gallery, it is generally assumed, “subversive” and alternative “presentation” is presented. A decoding of an unreflected knowledge regime is alleged to take place. The “all knowing map” that Perkins (2008) describes, immersed in the valley of scientific culture, suddenly vanishes. Deleuze puts all these assumptions into question. The chasm between different cultures of map use (Perkins 2008) and separated “knowledge regimes” in science and art becomes questionable. I tend to hold a similar view. Deleuze’s reflection on a pre-representational nature of maps is partly vindicated by considering maps in artistic settings - and within the trajectory maps of (autistic) children (Deleuze 1995). Maps therein placed show often more explicitly a pre-existing “ontology” by which the concrete artefact was created, while declining to be still considered “optimal representations” or on the epistemic level of meaning construction. With scientific maps, the reverse is rather the case.

Art seems to surge as the place where a map can be accepted as the “map of itself” (Terry Atkinson & John Baldwin 1967). However, that is not to say that this of-itselfness is absent in scientific maps. It is simply not visible, focused on or accepted as such.

One should consider also the following: scientific map-making is also never free from artistic and formal constraints that may even include...
general material aesthetic or affective constraints. This constitutes also a good rebuttal to those that defend an out-and-out apartheid between scientific and artistic regimes.

In order to maximize expository value, some formal choices have to be made by the scientific map-makers. An element of artistic preference will also be inescapable at that juncture. These choices may then act as constraints on the step-by-step process of scientific discourse itself.

The introduction of the grid as the standardized construction of an isotropic, homogenous space in modern “geometrist” (Bachelard 1994) within the model of “mathesis universalis” reducing real or qualitative experiential places or topological perspectives (embodied and embedded) to a quantifiable, measurable algebraic spatio-temporal space. This is however merely a passing suggestion – let us not pile more complexity into a subject already fraught with difficulties. It is sufficient for our purpose here merely to state that the artistic rendering of a grid, the legends, the graphical supports, etc, may be of the utmost importance in the actual process of doing science.

In the next section I would like to turn to the diagram category and some important issues linked to the spatial diagram. I will then try to say something about Charles Sanders Peirce concept of operational “diagrammatic thinking” in which the map is seen as a multiplicity of diagram structures, that may include also pictorial parts.

1. On diagrams

With a diagram we may create a new way of relating to uncharted territory. Diagrams succeed when they are able to instil what may be termed an effective dynamic of orientation.

The diagram is a method or a tool used to extend an already existing body of knowledge. The diagram differentiates the initially vague or inchoate in a new way, so that the structural parts of any entity in its rational relations appear and show itself more clear. Diagrammatics is, however, not so much about the concrete shapes and forms of geometrical representation or configuration of knowledge. The diagram also pressuposes a specific mode of conceptual reflection. Diagrammatic thinking is concerned with issues and with strategies of transformation of one order towards another. The questions the diagrammatic poses are: what are structures of connectivity and separation? How are such encounters performed? How do they evolve and show forces of change?
A brief foray into art territory brings home this point in a striking manner. In “Personal and Social Order” (2008), Erik Beltrán draws attention to the critical and creative components of map-making in scientific contexts:

![Map 2 Erick Beltrán (2008) “The personal social order”; from: “Calculum Series”, Poster b/w Edition of the Barcelona Exhibition at Galeria Joan Pratts December-January 2008/2009 A meta-diagrammatic conceptual playing with orders of thinking, representations and operations in different orders of knowledge, the sub-concepts and lines of which can be related, folded/unfolded in multiple representational and non-representational “clandestine” ways.](image)

In Beltrán’s concept map (2008) a non-hierarchical order of a multiplicity of white diagram structures is proposed on a black plane. Rectangular patterns of lines and curved lines partially intersect with conceptual names and its attributed or imagined significations on the black plane. At its very centre and thus orientating the constellation, the concept word, “diagrams” is readable. Witness that, also present in the same lettering
and size, are “ethics”, “category”, “map” as well as the knowledge disciplines of “physics” and “chemistry”, while towards the left the viewer’s attention is made to focus on the tension in language between such material techniques of “linguistics” as “calligraphy”, “typography”, and “voice”. The left bottom starts with an ellipse including the concept “signs”. On the top of this dynamic there enters an ellipse-like line proposing the concepts “Intuition”, “Statistics”, “Mathematics. The relational polymath nature of these concept-words are also important when reflecting on how the multiplicity of diagrams can show a structure or a scheme of thought that is perceived and observed as both discursive and iconic.

Map-making, however, is not conceivable without what we bring into it: the blueprint of our habits, the sense of orientation ingrained into our body (left/right hand etc.). Visual diagrams, as I will try to show in the following chapter are just the end-result of constructed knowledge tools. Their underpinnings – which Deleuze ontologizes (let us bracket for now the question of whether this move towards metaphysics is advisable or not) – lie elsewhere.

1.1 Visual diagrammatics

Mersch (2007) defines diagrams as a proper category (and not a go-between between words and images, or dicursivity and iconicity). According to Mersch, diagrams provide the structure of visual arguments. Diagrams can therefore be defined as visual-graphic schemata, that inform and perform arguments by the medium of the visual. Through diagrams, arguments can be inferred, proofed, refuted and hypothesized (see: Heßler/Mersch 2009, 31). Kramer (2010) invites us to think, in a similar fashion, on an “epistemology of the line”, through an extended discussion of the uses and functions of all its different forms (arrows, linking structures, Jordan curves, folds, knots etc.) Kemp (1974) offers an historically-embedded analysis of the place of visual diagrams in the western inquiry tradition by a reflection on the uses of ‘disegno’. A good way to sum up all these contributions to the study of diagrams, is to say that they all highlight the creative tension between the visible and the knowledgeable. Such tensions are what makes visual diagrams such a worthwhile and rewarding field of study. Both Bredekamp (2005:2007) and Bippus (2009) take this reflection one step further, by turning their attention to the thought-processes implicit in the very act of scribbling a diagram or jotting down a series of dots and lines. As both authors strive to make clear, there are cases in which one may speak with property – in a neo-wittgenstein fashioned of thinking, discovering and
creating with the hand. Kleist spoke of the creation of thought by/while speaking. In the same way, Bippus and Bredekamp “close-up” on the relation of eye, hand and thinking (see: Bippus 2009; Bredekamp 2005; 2007) speak of the creation of knowledge through drawing. Diagrams, as I have tried to show in the previous section, are not merely illustrative graphics. Taking up Bippus and Bredekamp probing at face value, one might even say diagrams can actually “show” reflection “caught unaware” – thought in its making, as it were.

Diagrams here do not just include pictorial representations, but can be understood in a broad sense. Krämer (2003) goes so far as to suggest that writing itself is best seen as being already a hybrid construct in which the linguistic and the iconic, telling and showing intersect. She develops this insight in a further refinement with her notion of “Schriftbildlichkeit” (notational iconicity). Here the diagrammatic category is interpreted as making thought “visible” by marks that contain both scriptural and iconic elements.

Finally, we close this survey of the state of the art with a pointer from Waldenfels (2004), who stresses that such a category between the sensible (intuitive) and the intelligible (conceptual) could not exist without the capacity for non-automatic, non-programmable constitutive creatural attention, not bridging the gap between the intuitive and conceptual sphere, but making it explicit to be thought and described.

1.2 Charles Saunders Peirce on diagrams

“Remember it is by icons only that we really reason, and abstract statements are valueless in reasoning except so far they aid us to construct diagrams” (The Logic of Quantity, CP 4.127, 1893)

According to Peirce, diagrams are what he terms eidetic operations or icons of relations. Diagrams for Peirce are Icons, signs that work operationally and therefore enable us to learn something new about the world. Exploring unknown territory, real or imaginary, calls for the drawing of lines, paths and trajectories.
Most probably - as we know so far - the oldest material map diagrams were carved 25,000 years ago into mammoth bones and stones as primary human knowledge tools; tools of orientation and memory; directing chaser to places of quarry and hoards of foodstuffs.

However, defining the map not as a representation of a part of the Earth’s surface as in modern cartography naturalizes and thus universalizes the map category; “it also obscures its origins in the rise of the state; and it ignores its role in the establishment and maintenance of social relations in those societies where it exists.” (Wood; Krygier 2009) It is, however, not our purpose to conflate material map artefacts in all its specific uses in a life-world situation with one specific projection type, or reducing maps to the modern science of geographic mapmaking. On the other hand it is also not my aim to state that by the map only fundamental human abilities of orientation, wayfinding, and other features of spatial intelligence are assumed. In the image above, we can see what could be called a proto-map for orientation in a specific life-world. Recently, the team of the Spanish archaeologist Pilar Utrilla (Utrilla et. all 2009) of the University of Saragossa deciphered what constitutes the oldest prehistoric map-like cartographic engraving in western Europe. This was found in 1993 on a hand-sized stone (1kg) in a cave in Abauntz, Navarra. In the above map-like stone the complex etchings engraved around 13,660 years ago, probably by Magdalenian hunter-gatherers in various times and using various diagramatic design styles, superimpose the discovery’s reference point of the „mountain“ San Gregorio with animal layers and other geographic layers. For the complementary account of a) mental maps and b) material map(or map-like)-artefacts for orientation in two anthropological models based on ethnographic research to account for the "wayfinding" ability of early humans see: Kirill Istomin and Mark Dwyer (2009).

Peirce also underlines that the observation of diagrams is essential to all reasoning - even if no auxiliary or transformative constructions
(manipulations) are performed - there is always a step from the general to a singular statement in deductive reasoning.

Diagrams thus are for Peirce pilots of complex relations, that reveal new knowledge about the world we pilot through by introducing or making explicit hidden or new elements of thought. In peircian epistemology, therefore, diagrams are crucial, since they highlight not only how deductive reasoning is operative, but also can elucidate the very nature of diverse forms of “abduction” (see: Hoffmann 2007).

In Peirce, diagrams are defined as “skeletal icons” (Stjernfelt 2007), representing their object analyzed into parts among which >> rational relations << hold, whether implicit or explicit.

One has, however, to be careful not to adopt a trivial definition of similarity when speaking about diagrams as part of iconicity. Similarity cannot be equated to “identity” with the object itself. Nor can it be psychologised to refer to merely subjective judgments or feelings of resemblance (see: Stjernfelt 2007). For Peirce it is by the icon that knowledge about an object grows:

“For a great distinguishing property of the icon is that by the direct observation of it other truths concerning its objects can be discovered than those which suffice to determine its constructions.”(CP 2.279, 1895)

This is what Krämer calls the operationality criteria (Krämer 2009). Thus meaning that icons are signs from which more and new information by observation and manipulation can be derived than what sufficed their construction (Stjernfelt 2000, 2006, 2007). In Peirce’s tripartite taxonomy of signs (icon, index, symbol) in the “Syllabus” of 1903 the diagram is treated as a special class of icon. The diagram is defined by similarity to the object that it represents and performs. The diagram presents its object by a “skeletonlike sketch of relations” (Stjernfelt 2007).
For Peirce the operational definition of diagrammatic thinking is the following:

“We form in the imagination some sort of diagrammatic, that is, iconic, representation of the facts, as skeletonized as possible. The impression of the present writer is that with ordinary persons this is always a visual image, or mixed visual and muscular (...). If visual, it will either be geometrical, that is, such that familiar spatial relations stand for the relations asserted in the premisses, or it will be algebraical, where the relations are expressed by objects which are imagined to be subject to certain rules are, whether conventional or experiential. “ (CP 2.778)

“By diagrammatic reasoning, I mean reasoning which constructs a diagram according to a precept expressed in general terms, performs experiments upon this diagram, notes their results, assures itself that similar experiments performed upon any diagram constructed according to the same precept would have same results, and expresses this in general terms. This was a discovery of no little importance, showing, as it does, that all knowledge without exception comes from observation.” From Peirce’s application to the Carnegie Institution" (dated July 15, 1902)[From Draft C (90-102)].
Schematically the diagrammatic thinking process is shown above in this meta-diagrammatic map, that would be better exemplified in a animated moving image of thought in which the arrows and the schematic fields of grey (results) and blue (operations) and the precepts and preconditions (red) the immaterial operations(white notations) and the material results(black notations) diagrammatic parts 1,2,1’2´are seen as momentary fixations and directions of a developing and changing process of diagram experimentation.

A map can be seen operationally as a subtype of the extended peircean operative diagram category (Stjernfelt 2007, 105-107; Stjernfelt this volume), in which the diagrammatic principles show up in its use of operations we conduct with the map. Stjernfelt names three of a multiplicity of possible operations that can be experimented with maps as orientational tools: “We may for instance (1) find a route between two localities, (2) determine a distance or an area, (3) recognize landscape forms- on so on”(Stjernfelt 2007, 105) The map-maker and the map manipulator don’t have to be the same entity. Which also obviously means that the intention of the mapmaker and the use, the map-manipulator makes of it, have not to be identical. Stjernfelt reminds us of the experimental part in transformations conducted with maps, “fulfilling the demands for revealing truths not stated in the construction of the diagram” (ibid.) This also shows that the material artefact object in itself is not diagrammatic: only by being used in such-and-such a manner does such a qualification accrue .One has to think of diagrammatics, including eidetic processes, as open-ended.

2. Notes on maps in contemporary art

2.1 Against the fictive scientific “all knowing map”

A 1:1 scale map of the solar system would not just be impossible to make. It would be also senseless. A fully detailed “map” giving “all” information of a world would be impracticable from the point of view of economics of reasoning and impossible to be handled. Perkins’ scientific map idealization of “the all-knowing map” (Perkins 2008, 156) is a mere ideal construction of a non-existing reality. A map should be handleable or operational by definition. A map is a helpful economical cognitive tool to orientate and navigate in an ocean of facts that is unfathomable. The context-smashing that occurs by placing a map artefact derived from geography in artistic contexts may help us realize this. By such a dislocation, certain conventions, rules, grammars, logics that are part and parcel of map-making can be made explicit.
This is a generative “linking machine” and not a fixed definite linkage map, that plays amusedly with our attention, and steers on multiple levels with possible relations of the entities envolved: lines, colours, word-concepts, etc.

An art-piece like the Map of Friendship of Art and Philosophy helps us to realize, by the very deconstruction of diagram schemes it offers, that maps “work not only by steering our attention into an “intensional” zone. They also de-territorialize our thoughts from a habitual zone of experimentation towards untrodden territory. And this is precisely what makes them subjects par excellence of contemporary aesthetic discourse. For the philosopher Steinweg the map should not be explained nor interpreted, but the necessity of the shown concepts should be reflected upon here in the relation of art and philosophy.

While the “context-smashing” of maps in art may provide bridges to Deleuze’s insights, thinking of maps in science as “context-feeding” or “context-refining” provides a link to a characteristically peircean diagrammatic reasoning. Thus, reflecting on the place of maps in cultural-artistic and in scientific contexts also brings to light serious differences within the philosophical debate – namely the debate between a position that has not dispelled from his discourses metaphysic undertones - Deleuze-
and a philosophical position that has jettisoned most of its ontological cargo in order to align itself squarely with “scientific” discourse – in the sense of operationality, Peirce.

After saying something about the twin topoi of maps and diagrams in contemporary artists’ discourse, in the last part of the paper I will try to pursue some of these default lines in the philosophical debate – focusing again on Deleuze and Peirce.

2.2 Artists as partial mapoclasts: displacements

Map 6 Artur Barrio “Uma faca lançada de um ponto qualquer de Portugal sobre um ponto não qualquer/A knife launched from a random point in Portugal to a non-random point”, 1975. Europe Map with kitchen knife, 100x154 cm. Collection of the artist.deposited at the Serralves Foundation Porto Photo of the exhibition “Portuguese Artists Abroad” 2008/2009 Lisbon Museum of Electricity (Photo: A. Gerner 2008).
The localisation that the title (or language diagram) refers to, draws a relation between the visual spatial artefact of this map as a 2-D plan towards the 3-D object of the knife that fixes a reference point in Switzerland on the map plane, cutting up the plane in a brute act of penetrating the 2D plane. The general and abstract orientation possibilities that the map represents is concretized by the individual gesture of thus dramatically fixing an end-point, anchoring the orientation and the visual focus of the observer of this map-artefact. The vagueness of the starting point indexed in the title “a knife launched from a random point in Portugal” is opposed to the point at which the knife cuts the map. One can speculate that the cut or partial damage that the knife provokes is itself a transformative and “context-smashing” act that serves to heighten by contrast the flatness and neutrality of the abstract western “episteme” of mathesis universalis.

Discussing “maps as artistic practices” Perkins (2008) gives several unsystematic examples of map use and map function that “encourage a performative encounter” (Perkins 2008). In Perkins’ view, the map is not just a visualization or a spatio-temporal object. For Perkins this is borne out in the manifold allusions and references to maps in “surrealists, pop artists, situationists, land artists, conceptual artists, community artists, digital media artists and live artists” (Perkins 2008, 156). Such “art-embedded” reflection on maps may include the following artistic treatments and “interventions” on maps:

“(…)fragmenting known maps and rearranging them in novel ways; juxtaposing far with near; distorting space into a relative or egocentric form; changing orientation; manipulating projection, scale and generalization to infringe accepted mapping standards; drawing on standard cartographic tropes such as the border, or naming to question social norms; abstracting and over-coding a known form; employing recognisable country shapes in new ways; shifting novel conceptual frames onto familiar icons such as the globe or tube map; and mapping onto different media so as to ask questions about the world or our identities” (Perkins 2008, 156).

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Four equal maps of the same area, the Grande Région of Luxemburg, France and Germany are successively painted over in a single colour using Bic’s famous ball-point pens. The partial re-picturalisation with one single colour assigned to each country, spares out the scale and the Grid A, B, C, (...)1, 2, 3, (...) and thus shows again a part of the diagrammatic structure of map-making. One may observe in passing, that a map completely filled with monochromatic colour plane (as the monochromatic overpaintings of the Malevitch) ceases to be a diagrammatic map tool: it is only by contrast and saliency that a map remains a map.
Does all this mean that “art” creates a “new” object? As we have hinted previously, the classic deleuzian move would be to question, not the boundaries between artistic and scientific frames of reference, but their relevance. The philosophical importance of the opposition of artistic praxis to scientific praxis of map-making and map use is fundamentally questioned. Not so much the absolute creation but the displacement of existing planes would be responsible for change. The really hard question is whether these techniques and strategies that artists apply “explicitly” wouldn’t also be present “implicitly” in scientific map-making and map-manipulation as well.

A sceptical rejoinder to this is that talk of “implicit” and “explicit” in philosophy is fraught with dangers, for it compromises us sooner or latter with acknowledging “ontologies”. Deleuze insists on locating the quid of the map category (Deleuze 1995) before any rational representative order of the diagram. A more modest and non-committal view would be the one that, while admitting that the orthodox/standardized use of maps is of course dependent on the intention of the analysed frame (artistic vs. scientific or expert vs. novice map-user), still acknowledges a commonality above and beyond “cultures of use” in the conceptual and philosophical problems maps raise.
The juxtaposition of the personal and political orders in the map of the Israeli artist Michael Druk: different pictorial colour elements, an explanatory legend, a scale of distance, a title and symbolic fixations of topographic areas as for example the “occupied territories”. His series of self-portraits metamorphoses geographical into psychographic maps (Debord) and vice versa. The tension in the relation between the topography of the territories in its occupied and unoccupied parts is rendered here as body orientation (left Druks right Druks etc.), and the split between the mediating, rational self and his sub-conscious, irrational part: not a cartesian ego of self-sovereignty, but the map of a “fractured I, of a dissolved ego”(Deleuze 1994,194) shows up. With Deleuze we enter a plane that Peirce leaves ill-reflected. Deleuze’s can be seen as a complementary task, a “topo-ontological” not a “logical” one. Deleuze purports to investigate the hidden assumptions, the orientational “map-ontologies”, or territories, that diagrams are “constituted” within. The “pure rationality” of a diagram as logic of relations is put into question, and seen as applied in a map of orientation before any representational order or meaning construction. For Deleuze, a kind of cartographic ontology precedes, the diagram category, while for Peirce the map is seen as a concrete subtype of the diagram.

“The diagram is no longer an auditory or visual archive but a map, a cartography(...). It is an abstract machine. It is defined by its informal functions and matter and in terms of form makes no distinction between content and expression, a discursive formation and a non-discursive formation.

It is a machine that is almost blind and mute, even though it makes others see and speak (...). If there are many diagrammatic functions and even matters, it is because every diagram is a spatio-temporal multiplicity.”Deleuze 1986 1988,34

It is not therefore merely a matter of deciding, whether the map is indexical or related with a material object (the territory) or whether it is the territory itself (see: England 2001). For Deleuze maps are not mere indexes of a res extensa. They are also “maps of intensity”:

“Maps (...) are superimposed in such a way that each map finds itself modified in the following map, rather than finding its origin in the preceding one: from one map to the next it is not a matter of searching an origin, but of evaluating displacements. Every map is a redistribution of impasses and breakthroughs, of thresholds and
enclosures, which necessarily go from bottom to top (...) Maps should not be understood only in extention, in relation to space constituted by trajectories. There are also maps of intensity, that are concerned with what fills space, what subtends the trajectories (...)” (Deleuze 1995, 61).

Therefore, the philosophical pregnant point for Deleuze is not that artistic interventions on maps “kill” and deconstruct “identities” and the conventionalized and pre-existing logic of representational relations and symbolic practices, offering “clandestine” counter-proposals to an “all knowing map” (Perkins 2008). For a pragmatist, the natural medium that suggests itself when discussing maps or diagrams is the scientific one.

Deleuze discourse, on the other hand, is concerned with an “ontological” prius that “pragmatist” talk of “roles” and “function” is said to obscure. To talk of “roles” and “functions” is somewhat to forget “essences”. Deleuze sees the proper task of philosophy to bring to light a more fundamental order of phenomena- the hidden constitution of such “things” as maps. Herby we have to start to investigate the dynamic aspect of a genetic cartographic a priori of orientation itself (see: Stegmaier 2008; Farinelli 1996, Weigel 2002) in which a posteriori diagram artefacts or perceptible structures of relations are produced in order to transform or displace any kind of orders (visual-spatial, topological, affective etc.).

As Karl Schlögel in his brilliant book “In space we read time” proposes, the necessity to make maps is therefore summed up in the following line:

“Always when a world comes to an end and a new is initiated, is the time of the map. Map-times stand for the transformation from one order (of space) towards another.”(Schlögel 2003, 87; brackets A.G.)

Deleuze and Peirce offer respectively an cartographic- ontological or a logical-operational decoding of this.
References


